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Abstract: We study market breakdown in a ﬁnance context under extreme ad-
verse selection with and without competitive pricing. Adverse selection is extreme
if for any price there are informed agent types with whom uninformed agents pre-
fer not to trade. Market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium
outcome. We present a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for market breakdown.
If the condition holds, then trade is not viable. If the condition fails, then trade can
occur under competitive pricing. There are environments in which the condition
holds and others in which it fails.
Keywords: Adverseselection, marketbreakdown, separation, competitivepric-
ing.
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1 Introduction
The presence of adverse selection can cause severe inefﬁciencies. This is most
starkly illustrated by Akerlof’s (1970) example where adverse selection leads to
market breakdown (i.e., no trade is the unique equilibrium outcome). This possi-
bility of market breakdown is particularly salient in ﬁnancial markets, since private
information is a major concern when reallocating risk. Glosten (1989) has shown
that market breakdown can arise in competitive ﬁnancial markets under adverse
selection. Speciﬁcally, market breakdown occurs in a CARA-normal environment,
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Bonn is gratefully acknowledged.
1with the notion of competition requiring separation, i.e., the equilibria are informa-
tionally efﬁcient in the sense that the investor’s payoff-relevant private information
is fully revealed.1 Since the distribution of private information has unbounded sup-
port, adverse selection is extreme: for any price there are informed investor types
with whom uninformed agents prefer not to trade. This extreme adverse selection
is necessary for market breakdown to arise in Glosten’s (1989) model of a compet-
itive market (Hellwig, 1992).
Glosten (1989) has shown that a monopoly market maker can sometimes fa-
cilitate trade when no trade is possible under his notion of competition. Compe-
tition in Glosten (1989) (and many other models) leads to pricing that precludes
cross-subsidization among trades, which we refer to as competitive pricing. This
raises the possibility that competitive pricing is a contributing factor in the mar-
ket breakdown found under extreme adverse selection, as it can be under non-
extreme adverse selection (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Leach and Mad-
havan (1993)).
We study market breakdown in a ﬁnance context under extreme adverse se-
lection with and without competitive pricing. We ﬁnd that competitive pricing is
not a contributing factor in market breakdown: If trade is viable (in the sense that
market makers do not lose money in expectation) then trade can also occur under
competitive pricing. The key to this ﬁnding is that competitive pricing does not
require informational efﬁciency.
Our environment generalizes Glosten (1989). There is a single informed, risk-
averse strategic trader (with CARA, i.e., constant absolute risk aversion, prefer-
ences)andriskneutralmarketmakers. Theinformedtradercanacteitherasabuyer
or as a seller; there are no restrictions on order sizes. There is a two-dimension ad-
verse selection problem in which the informed trader has private information about
the expected payoff of the risky asset as well as about his endowment. In Glosten
(1989), both of these random variables are normally distributed and the informed
trader’s private information can be summarized by a one-dimensional normally-
distributed type. Following Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), we make no
parametricdistributionassumptions, sothatthesummarizingone-dimensionaltype
need not be normally distributed (in fact, there are no essential restrictions on the
one-dimensional type distribution beyond symmetry and ﬁnite variance). This gen-
eralization from Glosten’s (1989) environment is important, because market break-
down under competitive pricing cannot occur in his environment, but can occur in
the generalization.
1The literature extending Glosten’s (1989) result (i.e., Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Bhattacharya, Reny, and Spiegel (1995)) also focuses on separating
competitive equilibria in CARA-normal environments.
2We view the unbounded type space as an idealization of the adverse selection
problem caused by large, but bounded type space. The model with unbounded type
space should thus be the limit of models with bounded type spaces. Unfortunately,
as we discuss in remarks 4.1 and 5.2, the nature of this limit model is unclear.
Consequently, like Hellwig (1992), we study extreme adverse selection as the limit
case of a sequence of markets in which bounded supports of the distribution of the
informed trader’s information become arbitrary large.
We identify a condition, the market breakdown condition, under which trade is
not viable (theorem 4.1). Moreover, if the condition does not hold, then trade can
occur under competitive pricing (theorem 4.2). The condition relates the distrib-
ution of the informed trader’s information to a simple measure of the gains from
trade. It is satisﬁed for a class of fat-tailed distributions, including Pareto (theo-
rem 4.3), while it fails for thin-tailed distributions (theorem 4.4), such as normal
(Glosten’s (1989) case). The market breakdown condition is thus not vacuous—
there are environments in which the condition holds and others in which it fails.
After describing the environment in the next section, we study non-extreme
adverse selection (i.e., bounded support distributions of the informed trader’s in-
formation) in section 3. In addition to being an important benchmark, this analysis
underpins our limit analysis. We deﬁne the central notions of competitive and
viable trading schedules in Subsection 3.1, and introduce the market breakdown
condition and discuss its relation to Glosten’s (1994) breakdown condition in Sub-
section 3.2. In subsection 4.1, we describe the nature of the limit analysis, and
present the main results (theorems 4.1–4.4)) in subsection 4.2, with the proof of
theorem 4.1 in section 6 and of theorem 4.2 in section 5. Technical details are
relegated to the appendix.
2 Information Structure and Preferences
We consider a market for a risky asset in which risk neutral market makers provide
liquidity to an informed trader who, depending on his private information, may
wish to buy or sell the risky asset. Following Glosten (1989, 1994) we refer to the
informed trader as the investor. Let x ∈ R denote the quantity of the risky asset
traded by the investor, with x > 0 corresponding to a purchase and x < 0 to a sale.
The corresponding monetary transfer is denoted by m∈R, with m<0 representing
an amount received by the investor and m > 0 an amount payed by the investor.
The ﬁnal value of the risky asset is ν = t +ε. The investor privately observes
t and his endowment ω of of the risky asset before trade takes place. The random
variables (t,ω) describing the investor’s private information are uncorrelated and
elliptically distributed (see Fang, Kotz, and Ng, 1990) with variances σ2
t > 0 and
3σ2
ω > 0. The random variable ε, realized after trade, is normally distributed with
variance σ2
ε > 0 and independent of (t,ω). For simplicity we assume t, ε, and ω
all have zero mean.
When engaging in a trade x resulting in a monetary transfer m, the investor’s
ﬁnal wealth is w = (x + ω)(t + ε) − m. (For simplicity the risk-free rate and
the investor’s initial money holdings are assumed to be zero.) The investor has
CARA preferences with risk aversion parameter γ > 0. As ε is normally distrib-
uted this yields, as usual, a convenient quadratic representation U(x,m | t,ω) of
the investor’s preferences over (x,m) ∈ R conditional on his private information.
Deﬁning
r ≡ γσ2
ε > 0, (1)
such a representation is given by (see Biais, Martimort, and Rochet, 2000)2
U (x,m |t,ω) = (t −rω)x−rx2/2−m.




θ ≡ E[ν |t −rω] = E[t +ε |t −rω],
the linear conditional expectation property of elliptically distributed random vari-













Conditional on θ, the investor’s preferences over trade-transfer-pairs are thus
described by the utility function




Market makers are risk neutral and maximize expected trading proﬁts. It suf-
ﬁces for our purposes to consider aggregate trading proﬁts m−νx. Conditional on
θ, expected aggregate trading proﬁts are given by
V (x,m | θ) = m−θx. (5)
2This quadratic representation holds for all distributions of t and ω, since these variables are
known to the investor. The quadratic representation does rely on CARA preferences and normality
of the noise term ε. We could avoid the normality assumption on ε by assuming the investor has
mean-variance preferences.
4The above assumptions on the information structure and traders’ preferences
are as in Glosten (1989), with the important exception that we do not restrict the
randomvariables(t,ω)describingtheinvestor’sprivateinformationtobenormally
distributed. We assume these variables are elliptically distributed without imposing
further parametric assumptions.3 This yields payoff functions (4) and (5) identical
to those arising in Glosten’s (1989) environment (and used in Hellwig’s (1992)
analysis of Glosten’s competitive model) while dispensing with normality of θ.
The distribution of θ is, however, not completely arbitrary, as (2) determines
θ as a function of the elliptically distributed random variables (t,ω) and the un-
derlying parameters γ and σ2
ε. In particular, it is immediate from our assumptions
on (t,ω) that the distribution function of θ, denoted by F, is symmetric and has
a ﬁnite variance. The following result (proved in appendix A) shows that the ad-
ditional requirement that F has a density decreasing in the absolute value of θ
sufﬁces to ensure consistency with the underlying environment.
Lemma 2.1 For any b > 1 and r > 0 and any symmetric distribution function F
with ﬁnite variance and density decreasing in |θ|, there exist γ > 0 and random
variables (t,ω,ε) satisfying the assumptions introduced above such that F is the
distribution function of θ.
Our analysis is conducted in the reduced form environment, with the investor’s
private information summarized by his one-dimensional type θ and payoff func-
tions given by u(x,θ)−m for the investor and m−v(x,θ) for market makers, where





v(x,θ) = θx. (7)
The parameters of this environment are r, b, and the distribution function F of θ.
We assume r >0 and b>1, as required by the underlying environment (see (1) and
(3)). For F we assume the following (which adds some conditions on the density
to the conditions of Lemma 2.1).
Assumption 2.1 The distribution function F of θ is symmetric with ﬁnite variance
and connected support Θ. It possesses a strictly positive and, for all θ 6= 0, twice
continuously differentiable density f, which is decreasing in |θ|.
We can interpret the reduced form environment with payoffs (6) and (7) in
terms of the economic considerations of the underlying structural environment.
3Foster and Viswanathan (1993) similarly extend Kyle’s (1985) model by considering elliptically
rather than normally distributed random variables.
5The type θ is the expected payoff of the risky asset conditional on the investor’s
marginal valuation of the risky asset at x = 0. The parameter b is a measure of
the investor’s informational advantage in predicting the asset’s ﬁnal payoff condi-
tional on his type θ being commonly known, whereas the parameter r measures
the strengths of the investor’ hedging motive for trade (caused by his risk aversion
and the variability of his initial endowment).
As the investor’s preferences over (x,m) are quasilinear in m, the surplus re-
sulting from type θ trading quantity x of the risky asset is given by














Note that ﬁrst best quantities are increasing and unbounded in θ, and assumption
2.1 implies that ex ante ﬁrst best surplus is ﬁnite.
3 Non-Extreme Adverse Selection
Assumption 2.1 implies that the support of F is either given by R or by a bounded
interval of the form [−τ,τ], where τ > 0. We say adverse selection is extreme
when for any price there are investor types with whom market makers prefer not
to trade. Given our parameterization, this condition can be written as: for all x 6= 0
and all p∈R, there exists θ ∈Θ such that (p−θ)x<0. Extreme adverse selection
thus arises if and only if Θ = R. We study here non-extreme adverse selection (the
bounded case), as it is both a benchmark and a central tool in our investigation of
extreme adverse selection.
4The ﬁrst best quantity as given by (9) is deﬁned with respect to the reduced form environment.
It maximizes surplus under the constraint that trades are measurable with respect to θ. This is to be
distinguished from the ﬁrst best allocation of the underlying structural environment, which provides
complete insurance for the informed agent’s endowment shock ω.
63.1 Competitive and Viable Market Structures
Rather than providing an explicit game theoretic model of the trading process, we
modelthetradingdecisionoftheinvestorasthesolutiontotheproblemofchoosing
an optimal trade when faced with a price schedule p : R → R, specifying a price
per unit of the risky asset as a function of the investor’s trade. The solution to this
maximization problem results in a trading schedule q : [−τ,τ] → R specifying a
trade for each type of the investor in the support of the type distribution F.
In line with models of competitive market making such as Kyle (1985) and
Rochet and Vila (1994), we suppose that competition between market makers re-
sults in a price schedule under which market makers obtain zero expected proﬁts
conditional on the quantity traded. Let E[· ] denote the expectation with respect to
F.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Suppose Θ = [−τ,τ]. A price schedule p and a trading schedule q
are competitive if p implements q,
q(θ) ∈ argmax
x∈R
u(x,θ)− p(x)x, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (11)
and both the zero-proﬁt condition,
p(x) = E[θ | q(θ) = x], ∀x ∈ q(Θ), (12)
and the sequentiality condition,
p(x) ∈ Θ, ∀x ∈ R, (13)
are satisﬁed.
The sequentiality condition (13) insists that for all possible quantities, the price
schedule specify a price consistent with zero proﬁts, reﬂecting competition be-
tween market makers with some common belief over the possible types of the
investor who might have chosen such a quantity. It is thus akin to a Kreps and
Wilson (1982)-sequentiality requirement.5 We refer to price and trading schedules
satisfying the implementability (11) and the zero-proﬁt (12) conditions, but not
necessarily the sequentiality condition, as zero-proﬁt.
5Atradingscheduleiscompetitiveinoursenseifandonlyifitisasequentialequilibriumoutcome
of a signaling game in which the investor chooses a quantity of the risky asset to trade and the market
makers then compete a la Bertrand to take the other side of the trade (see Kreps (1990, Section
17.3) for an extended discussion in the context of Spence (1973)-job market signaling). The analysis
of Gale and Hellwig (2004), which studies a general equilibrium model of an insurance market
with adverse selection, provides an alternative “micro-foundation” for our deﬁnition of competitive
trading schedules.
7Our notion of competition does not impose separation, where a trading sched-
ule is said to be separating if it is one-to-one. In contrast to Glosten (1989) (and
the other papers mentioned in footnote 1) we allow for pooling (i.e., different types
of the investor choosing the same quantity) in a competitive trading schedule. Re-
quiring pricing to be competitive in the sense of deﬁnition 3.1 thus eliminates the
possibility of cross-subsidization among quantities, while not handicapping com-
petition by imposing the additional requirement of informational efﬁciency (in the
sense that prices must be equal to the expected value of the risky asset conditional
on the investor’s type).6 This allows us to address on the question whether, as
suggested in Glosten (1989, 1994), cross-subsidization among quantities plays an
essential role in avoiding market breakdown.
Rather than considering a particular model of the trading process as an alter-
native to competitive pricing, we consider all market structures in which market
makers obtain non-negative aggregate proﬁts. This is captured in the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Suppose Θ = [−τ,τ]. A price schedule p and a trading schedule q
are viable if p implements q and
E[(p(q(θ))−θ)q(θ)] ≥ 0.
Note that zero-proﬁt and so, in particular, competitive price and trading sched-
ules, are viable. Glosten’s (1994) model of a discriminatory limit order market
results in price and trading schedules which are viable, but not competitive in the
sense of deﬁnition 3.1 (as there is cross-subsidization among different trade sizes)
even though market makers obtain zero expected trading proﬁts. Screening models
in which market makers post price schedules (Biais, Martimort, and Rochet, 2000)
result in viable, but not competitive, price and trading schedules in which market
makers obtain strictly positive expected trading proﬁts.
Because the investor’s preferences satisfy single-crossing (uxθ > 0, where sub-
scripts denote partial derivatives), requiring a trading schedule q be implemented
6As a property of trading schedules, separation is not a natural implication of competition per se,
but a common and convenient assumption that allows researchers to study informational efﬁciency. If
the market is modeled as signaling game, reﬁnements in the spirit of those proposed by Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986) and Cho and Kreps (1987) provide formal support for such a focus on separation.
See Gale (1992, 1996) for a related Walrasian approach to competition in markets with adverse
selection yielding similar conclusions. While Kohlberg and Mertens’s (1986) strategic stability has
an abstract continuity motivation, the “intuitive” motivations for some of its implications seem less
persuasive (Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite, 1993). See also Laffont and Maskin (1990)
who consider a ﬁnancial market signalling model (more akin to the model in Leland and Pyle (1977)
than to the one we consider) and argue that separating trading schedules will not be observed when
they are interim inefﬁcient in the set of competitive trading schedules (as is always the case in our
environment, see section 5.2).
8by some price schedule p imposes signiﬁcant structure on the trading schedule.
Standard results from mechanism design (Rochet (1987, Proposition 1) and Mil-
grom and Segal (2002, Theorem 2)) imply the following:
Lemma 3.1 Suppose Θ = [−τ,τ]. There exists a price schedule p such that p
implements q if and only if q is increasing (θ ≤ θ0 ⇒ q(θ) ≤ q(θ0)).




θ0 uθ(q( ˜ θ), ˜ θ)d ˜ θ = b
Z θ
θ0 q( ˜ θ)d ˜ θ (14)
for all θ,θ0 ∈[−τ,τ], where R(θ)=u(q(θ),θ)−p(q(θ))q(θ) is the rent function.
3.2 Market Breakdown
Given either viability or competition, the natural deﬁnition of market breakdown
under non-extreme adverse selection is that the only viable or competitive trading
schedule is the no-trade trading schedule given by q(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Since
every economically interesting trading schedule must be viable, we reserve the
term market breakdown for the case where the only viable trading schedule is the
no-trade schedule. If there is no market breakdown in this sense, but the only
competitive trading schedule is the no-trade trading schedule, we say competition
causes market breakdown.
Todevelopourintuitionforthenon-extremeadverseselectioncase, itishelpful
to momentarily consider the environment with more general investor payoffs u
satisfying single crossing uxθ >0 and strict concavity uxx <0. Glosten (1994) then
provides a simple intuition for the condition characterizing market environments
in which market breakdown occurs. Trade can occur when there is a price at which
market makers are willing to engage in a small transaction with the non-empty
pool of investor types willing to engage in that transaction. If no such price can
be found, market breakdown results. In particular, proposition 5 in Glosten (1994)
suggests that the condition
E[ ˜ θ | ˜ θ < θ] ≤ ux(0,θ) ≤ E[ ˜ θ | ˜ θ > θ], ∀θ ∈ (−τ,τ) (15)
isnecessaryandsufﬁcientformarketbreakdownwhenthesupportofF isbounded.7
Because of single crossing, the set of investor types willing to sell the risky asset at
7Glosten does not consider the case in which condition (15) holds with equality and imposes a
regularity condition on price schedules (see corollary 1 and the subsequent discussion in Glosten
(1994)). Using the techniques developed in N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (2007), it is straightforward to
show that (15) is in fact necessary and sufﬁcient for market breakdown when uxθ > 0 and uxx < 0.
9a price p = ux(0,θ) is given by ˜ θ < θ, and so the left inequality in (15) precludes
small trades x < 0; similarly, the right inequality precludes small trades x > 0.
In our environment, F is symmetric and the investor’s marginal willingness
to pay for the risky asset is given by ux(x,θ) = bθ −rx, and so condition (15) is
equivalent to
(b−1)θ ≤ e(θ), ∀θ ∈ [0,τ), (16)
where e : [0,τ) → R is the mean excess function (or residual life function) of the
distribution function F,
e(θ) = E[ ˜ θ −θ | ˜ θ > θ].
Because the right side vanishes as θ approaches the upper bound τ and the left-
hand-side is clearly strictly positive for all θ > 0 (recall we have assumed b >
1), this condition is never satisﬁed, and so market breakdown does not arise with
bounded support. Moreover, competition does not cause market breakdown, as
there exist competitive trading schedules satisfying q(θ) 6= 0 for all θ 6= 0 (lemma
5.1 below) so that almost all types trade a non-zero quantity, a situation we refer to
as a liquid market.
However, as discussed by Hellwig (1992), this does not rule out the possibil-
ity that as the support becomes arbitrarily large, the quantities transacted become
arbitrarily small for most types. As we will demonstrate below, for distributions
with unbounded support the counterpart to (16) may hold and it is exactly in these
circumstances that market breakdown becomes an issue.
4 Extreme Adverse Selection
4.1 Capturing Extreme Adverse Selection
We study extreme adverse selection as the limit of a sequence of environments in
which bounded supports of the distribution of θ become arbitrarily large. Let F∗
be a distribution with unbounded support satisfying assumption 2.1. We refer to
F∗ as the limit distribution function and say that for τ > 0 a distribution function F
is a τ-truncation of F∗ if it is obtained from F∗ by conditioning on θ ∈ [−τ,τ]:
F(θ) =

   
   
1, if θ > τ,
F∗(θ)−F∗(−τ)
F∗(τ)−F∗(−τ)
, if θ ∈ [−τ,τ],
0, if θ < −τ.
10Let {τn} denote a strictly positive sequence satisfying τn → ∞ as n → ∞. The τn-
truncation of F∗ is denoted by Fn. Observe that {Fn} converges weakly to F∗.8,9
Deﬁnition 4.1 Asequence{(τn,qn,pn)}isviable(respectively, competitiveor zero-
proﬁt) if for all n, (pn,qn) is viable (resp., competitive or zero-proﬁt) given the type
distribution Fn.
The counterpart to our notion of market breakdown in the bounded case is that
all viable (and thus all competitive) sequences converge to a closed market in the
sense of the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A viable sequence {(τn,qn,pn)} converges to a closed market if for




If there are viable sequences not converging to a closed market, which merely
requires the existence of some type for which qn(θ) does not converge to zero, it
is of interest of ask whether there are sequences which converge to a well-deﬁned
limit. The following deﬁnition adds the requirement that in such a limit all types
but θ = 0 trade a non-zero-quantity, corresponding to our notion of a liquid market
for the bounded case.
Deﬁnition 4.3 A viable sequence {(τn,qn,pn)} converges to a liquid market if for




We will show that the two deﬁnitions exhaust all relevant possibilities.
Remark 4.1 (Extreme Adverse Selection as an Idealization) Ifoneviews(aswe
do) the unbounded type space as an idealization of a situation with large, but
bounded type space, the model with unbounded type space should be the limit
of models with bounded type spaces. The nature of this limit model is unclear. We
discuss here one problem which indicates why adopting the deﬁnitions of compet-
itive and viable schedules to the unbounded support case is unsatisfactory. For all
8We work with truncations to simplify notation. Our analysis applies essentially unchanged to
sequences of distributions with bounded supports {Fn} converging weakly to F∗, provided each Fn
satisﬁes assumption 2.1 and supn
R
|θ|α dFn(θ) < ∞ for some α > 2, so that the relevant moments
converge (Chung, 1974, Theorem 4.5.2).
9Any τ-truncation of F∗ satisﬁes assumption 2.1 and is thus consistent with the underlying en-
vironment of the information structure and preferences (since r is ﬁxed, the underling preference
parameter γ and variance σ2
ε can be taken as ﬁxed).
11τ, the no-trade trading schedule given by q(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [−τ,τ], is viable.
However, there is no price schedule implementing the limit of no-trade trading
schedules as τ → ∞: Given any price schedule p : R → R and any x > 0, type θ
can ensure the payoff [bθ − p(x)]x−rx2/2 by choosing x. For sufﬁciently large θ
this expression will be strictly positive, precluding q(θ) = 0 as the optimal choice
for such a type θ.10 We discuss another possible formulation of the limit model in
remark 5.2.

4.2 The Main Results
The counterpart to condition (16) for the limit distribution F∗ is
(b−1)θ ≤ e∗(θ), ∀θ ≥ 0, (17)
where
e∗(θ) ≡ E∗[ ˜ θ −θ | ˜ θ > θ],
is the mean excess function for the limit distribution and E∗ denotes expectation
with respect to F∗. If this market breakdown condition holds, then there is market
breakdown in the sense that every viable sequence converges to a closed market.
Theorem 4.1 If the market breakdown condition (17) holds, then every viable
sequence converges to a closed market.
Our next result shows that the market breakdown condition is necessary as well
as sufﬁcient for market breakdown. Indeed, it shows much more: competition is
not a cause of market breakdown.
Theorem 4.2 If the market breakdown condition (17) fails, then for every se-
quence {τn} with τn → ∞, there exists an associated competitive sequence con-
verging to a liquid market.
Glosten (1994) has suggested that a necessary ingredient for a market structure
to avoid market breakdown (when it can be avoided) is a “small-trade spread.”
Under such a spread, all types in a neighborhood of the zero type do not trade,
10One could follow Glosten (1989) in interpreting the non-existence of any viable (resp. competi-
tive) trading schedule in a model with unbounded support as market breakdown. In our view, such an
approach is only warranted if the non-existence corresponds to the convergence of every sequence of
viable (resp. competitive) trading schedules to the no-trade trading schedule. Except for the special
case of the separating competitive trading schedules studied by Hellwig (1992) (see section 5.1), no
such result is available.
12precluding convergence to a liquid market. Since we have convergence to a liquid
market, and not just the absence of market breakdown, when (17) fails, theorem
4.2 shows that, in our setting at least, a small-trade spread is not needed to avoid
market breakdown.
The proofs of the two theorems are logically independent and we ﬁnd it ped-
agogically convenient to prove them in reverse order. We prove theorem 4.2 in
section 5, where we explicitly construct the associated competitive sequence for
any sequence of truncations τn → ∞. In section 6, we prove theorem 4.1.
In the remainder of this section we discuss circumstances under which the mar-
ket breakdown condition (17) will or will not hold. In particular, are there limit
distributions F∗ for which (17) holds, i.e., can extreme adverse selection indeed
cause market breakdown?11
If b > 2, the answer is no: Hellwig (1992) constructs a competitive sequence
converging to a liquid market (see lemma 5.2 below).
For any b < 2, on the other hand, there are limit distributions (satisfying as-
sumption 2.1) for which (17) holds. One example of such a distribution is obtained
via symmetrization of a translated Pareto distribution (the proof is in appendix C):
Theorem 4.3 Suppose b < 2. The market breakdown condition holds for the sym-




(θ +1)−β, θ ≥ 0,
if 2 < β ≤ b/(b−1).12
Remark 4.2 It is straightforward to verify that for the distribution in theorem 4.3,
decreases in the parameter β induce ﬁrst-order-stochastic shifts in the ﬁrst-best
surplus. Since the market-breakdown condition fails for small values of β but not
for large values, a change in the type distribution leading to a ﬁrst-order-stochastic
dominant increase in the distribution of ﬁrst-best gains from trade may thus cause
a liquid market to close.

11This question is of particular interest, as (to the best of our knowledge) all previous examples
where no trade is the only viable outcome in a ﬁnancial market context (see Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), Leach and Madhavan (1993), Glosten (1994)) rely on the existence of a mass of risk neutral
informed investors, with risk neutrality precluding gains from trade between these investors and
market makers.
12The distribution F∗ satisﬁes assumption 2.1. It has ﬁnite variance because β > 2. Since b < 2
implies 2 < b/(b−1), there are β > 2 satisfying β ≤ b/(b−1).







will satisfy (17). Conversely, if the limit appearing in (18) is well-deﬁned, (18)
is clearly necessary for market breakdown. The following result builds on this
observation to obtain a more explicit necessary condition for market breakdown.






have a well-deﬁned limit as θ → ∞. This mild regularity condition ensures that
limθ→∞e∗(θ)/θ exists. The distributions commonly studied in economics satisfy
this property.13
Theorem 4.4 Suppose the limit of g∗(θ) as θ → ∞ (which may be inﬁnite) exists
and suppose for k ≥ 2, the kth moment of F∗ is ﬁnite. Then for all b ≥ k/(k−1),
the market breakdown condition (17) fails and there exist competitive sequences
converging to a liquid market.
When the regularity condition on the proportional hazard rate holds, theorem
4.4 implies, in particular, that for any given b > 1 the market breakdown condition
fails if all moments of F∗ exist. Hence, a necessary condition for the market break-
down condition (17) is that F∗ has fat tails. In terms of the underlying structural
environment, it also follows that if all moments of (the limit distributions) of t and
ω are ﬁnite (such as in Glosten’s (1989) environment, where these variables are
normally distributed), the market breakdown condition fails.
Remark 4.3 Suppose, as for many commonly studied distributions, the density f∗
of F∗ is log-concave on R+.14 By An (1998, proposition 1), e∗(θ) is decreasing
in θ, providing a simple proof that the market breakdown condition will not hold
for sufﬁciently large θ in this case. As log-concavity of the density implies that
the hazard rate (and thus the proportional hazard rate) is increasing and that all
moments of F∗ exist (An, 1998, corollary 1), this result is a special case of theorem
4.4.
13It is satisﬁed by any distribution F∗ with a truncation from below possessing an increasing pro-
portional hazard rate. See van den Berg (1994) for an extensive discussion of distributions possessing
an increasing proportional hazard rate.
14Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) contains a list of parametric families of distribution functions
with log-concave densities. Note that f∗ will be log-concave on R+ whenever it is obtained by
symmetrizing the log-concave density function of a distribution with support R+.
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5 Competitive Trading Schedules and Liquid Markets
Inthissection, weprovetheorem4.2. Weanalyzeseparatingcompetitiveschedules
in section 5.1. These schedules converge to liquid markets for b > 2. When b ≤ 2,
the distortions required by separation result in the separating competitive schedules
converging to a closed market (even when the market breakdown condition fails).
Reducing these distortions requires pooling some types, and as an intermediate
step we analyze tail-pooling schedules in section 5.2. We prove theorem 4.2 in
section 5.3 using semi-pooling competitive trading schedules. In these schedules,
the distortions implied by separation are ameliorated by pooling the right set of
types of investors.
Because our environment is symmetric, we can restrict attention to symmetric
competitive and zero-proﬁt trading and price schedules, where a trading schedule
is symmetric if q(−θ)=−q(θ) for all θ ∈[0,τ] and a corresponding deﬁnition ap-
plies for price schedules. Note that a symmetric trading schedule satisﬁes q(0) = 0
and that (from lemma 3.1) negative types sell the risky asset (q(θ) ≤ 0 for θ < 0)
and positive types buy the risky asset (q(θ) ≥ 0 for θ > 0). We specify such trad-
ing schedules only for positive types (and the corresponding implementing price
schedules only for positive quantities) with the extension to negative types (and
negative quantities) then given by symmetry. Since the trading schedules for pos-
itive types maximize u(x,θ)− p(x)x over x ≥ 0, it is immediate that no type ﬁnds
it proﬁtable to choose a quantity speciﬁed for a type of a different sign.
5.1 Separating Trading Schedules
Here we present some preliminary results on separating zero-proﬁt trading sched-
ules. While these results are essentially in Hellwig (1992), technical differences
preclude our simply appealing to his paper. A slight modiﬁcation of the arguments
in Mailath (1987) yields the following lemma (see appendix D for the proof of the
ﬁrst statement, the second statement follows from the discussion after the lemma).
Lemma 5.1 Suppose Θ = [−τ,τ]. For all ¯ x ∈ (0,qFB(τ)], there exists a unique
symmetric separating zero-proﬁt trading schedule q:[−τ,τ]→R satisfying q(τ)=
¯ x. Furthermore, a separating zero-proﬁt trading schedule is competitive if and only
if it is symmetric and satisﬁes q(τ) = qFB(τ). Hence, there is a unique separating
competitive trading schedule for every τ > 0.
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Figure 1: The separating competitive trading schedule qs for b ≤ 2. The trading
schedule qs is tangential to the θ-axis at θ = 0.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the separating competitive trading schedule. As usual,
in a separating trading schedule, imposing the sequentiality condition determines
the behavior of the “worst” types. Among positive types the worst belief the market
makers can hold is θ = τ, while among negative types the worst belief is θ =
−τ. Since each type receives his or her type as the price in a separating zero
proﬁt price schedule (p(q(θ)) = θ), the worst types cannot be disciplined in a
separating competitive trading schedule and so choose their “ﬁrst-best” quantity,
qFB(θ). Due to the incentive constraints, the quantities for all types in the intervals
(−τ,0) and (0,τ) are distorted from their ﬁrst best level towards zero. For a given
support of the type distribution, the degree of distortion is determined by the trade-
off between the incentive to mislead the market and the increased cost of lowered
diversiﬁcation, i.e. the parameters b and r in the investor’s utility function. Note
that, as illustrated in the ﬁgures, the structure of the separating competitive trading
schedules is different for the cases b ≤ 2 and b > 2.
The behavior of the investor in a separating competitive trading schedule de-
pends on the characteristics of the distribution of the private information in a lim-
ited and particular way. The value of the boundary type completely determines the
separating competitive trading schedule, with other characteristics of the distribu-
tion function irrelevant. On the other hand, again as usual, increasing the sever-
ity of adverse selection by increasing τ has a signiﬁcant impact on the separating
competitive trading schedule. In particular, competitive sequences with separating
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Figure 2: The separating competitive trading schedule qs for b > 2. The trading
schedule qs is tangential to the line q = (b−2)θ/r at θ = 0.
market if b ≤ 2 (again, see appendix D for the proof):
Lemma 5.2 Suppose {(τn,qn,pn)} is a competitive sequence with qn separating
for each n. If b ≤ 2, the competitive sequence converges to a closed market. If b >
2, the competitive sequence converges to a liquid market; in particular qn(θ) →
(b−2)θ/r for all θ.
Lemma 5.2 implies that for all sequences {τn} satisfying τn → ∞ there is an
associated competitive sequence converging to a liquid market when b > 2.15 To
show that the failure of (17) is sufﬁcient for the existence of competitive sequences
converging to a liquid market, it thus sufﬁces to consider the case b ∈ (1,2] for the
remainder of this section.
Remark 5.1 (Discontinuity at inﬁnity) Forb>2, theseparatingcompetitivetrad-
ing schedules qn and price schedules pn converge pointwise to the linear equilib-
rium in Glosten (1989). The additional separating competitive trading schedules
identiﬁed by Glosten (1989) for the limit market environment are eliminated as
potential limit outcomes by the sequentiality condition, pn(x) ∈ [−τn,τn].

15It is then an implication of theorem 4.1 that (17) must fail for b > 2.
175.2 Tail-pooling Schedules
For b ≤ 2, separating competitive sequences converge to a closed market because
the distortions required to separate all types become arbitrarily large as τ becomes
arbitrarily large. A natural conjecture (see, for example, Hellwig (1992, footnote
3)) is that pooling extreme types eliminates the negative impact of requiring all
types to separate. As we demonstrate in this subsection, this conjecture is cor-
rect in the sense that pooling extreme types does yield a zero-proﬁt sequence that
converges to a liquid market if the market breakdown condition fails. However,
pooling types in the tail does not generate competitive sequences that converge to
a liquid market, so the result obtained here falls short of theorem 4.2. This defect
is rectiﬁed in the next subsection, where we construct a competitive sequence con-
verging to a liquid market (when the market breakdown condition fails) that also
converges to the same limit trading schedule in which extreme types are pooled.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A symmetric trading schedule q is tail-pooling if there exists a cut-
off type 0 < ˆ θ ∈ Θ and a pooling quantity ˆ x > 0 such that
q(θ) = ˆ x, ∀θ > ˆ θ
and the restriction of q to [− ˆ θ, ˆ θ] is separating.
Suppose the market breakdown condition (17) fails, so that for some ˆ θ > 0
we have (b−1) ˆ θ > e∗( ˆ θ). This raises the possibility of pooling all types θ > ˆ θ
at a strictly positive quantity and price that allows market makers to break even.
Accordingly, we construct a tail-pooling trading schedule qt with cut-off type ˆ θ
for the limit case, Θ = R. The pooling quantity ˆ x maximizes ˆ θ’s payoff under
zero-proﬁt pricing (p(ˆ x) = E∗[θ | θ > ˆ θ] = ˆ θ +e∗( ˆ θ)), i.e.,
ˆ x = argmax
x




((b−1) ˆ θ −e∗( ˆ θ))
r
> 0. (19)
The payoff to type ˆ θ from choosing ˆ x is U∗( ˆ θ) ≡ ((b−1) ˆ θ −e∗( ˆ θ))2/r, which is
strictly positive from (19).
We now describe the separating component of qt. Let ¯ x ∈ (0, ˆ x) be the quantity
making type ˆ θ indifferent between revealing his type at ¯ x and joining the pool,
i.e., ¯ x is the (unique) quantity ¯ x ∈ (0, ˆ x) satisfying u(¯ x, ˆ θ)− ˆ θ ¯ x = U∗( ˆ θ).16 The
separating component is given by the separating zero-proﬁt schedule on [− ˆ θ, ˆ θ]
with initial value qt( ˆ θ) = ¯ x. By lemma 5.1, this schedule is unique.
16The quantity ¯ x is well-deﬁned, because U∗( ˆ θ) > 0.
18Consider now τn →∞. We construct, for large n, a symmetric tail-pooling zero-
proﬁt trading schedule qn with cut-off type ˆ θ and pooling quantity ˆ x, converging
pointwise to qt.
Suppose n is sufﬁciently large that ˆ θ < τn. The zero-proﬁt condition requires a
price at the quantity ˆ x of
pn(ˆ x) = En
 ˜ θ | ˜ θ > ˆ θ

= ˆ θ +en( ˆ θ). (20)
The payoff to type ˆ θ from choosing ˆ x is then given by




Because en( ˆ θ) → e∗( ˆ θ) (lemma B.2), Un( ˆ θ) converges to U∗( ˆ θ) > 0. Thus, for
sufﬁcientlylargen, thepayoffUn( ˆ θ)isstrictlypositive, andforsuchnweconstruct
a symmetric zero-proﬁt trading schedule.
Set qn(θ) = ˆ x for all θ ∈ ( ˆ θ,τn]. To complete the speciﬁcation of the trading
schedule qn, we proceed analogously to the limit case. Letting ¯ xn ∈ (0, ˆ x) be the
quantity making type ˆ θ indifferent between revealing his type at ¯ xn and joining the
pool, there is a symmetric separating zero-proﬁt trading schedule qn : [− ˆ θ, ˆ θ] → R
satisfying the initial value qn( ˆ θ) = ¯ xn.
The price schedule is determined for quantities in the range of qn by using
the zero proﬁt condition, i.e., (20) and pn(qn(θ)) = θ for all θ ∈ [− ˆ θ, ˆ θ]. Stan-
dard arguments using the single-crossing property of u show that no type has
an incentive to choose the quantity of another type. By specifying sufﬁciently
unattractive prices for quantities outside the range of qn, no type has an incentive
to choose quantities outside the range, and so the symmetric tail-pooling schedule
constructed in this way is implementable.
Clearly, ¯ xn → ¯ x, and so qn(θ) → qt(θ) for all θ. Since qt(θ) = 0 only if θ = 0,
we have proved the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose there exists ˆ θ > 0 satisfying (b−1) ˆ θ > e∗( ˆ θ). For every
{τn} with τn → ∞, there exists an associated zero-proﬁt sequence {(τn,qn,pn)}
converging to a liquid market, with limnqn(θ) = qt(θ) for all θ.
The sequence constructed in the proof of lemma 5.3 is not competitive: For
any price schedule pn implementing the trading schedule qn constructed above, the
payoff received by type τn is given by
Un(τn) = b[τn− ˆ θ]ˆ x+Un( ˆ θ).
As Un( ˆ θ) converges to a ﬁnite limit, it follows that Un(τn) is of order O(τn), while
from (10), sFB(τn) is of order O(τ2
n), so that eventually Un(τn) < sFB(τn). If pn is
19a competitive price schedule, type τn can obtain a payoff at least equal to sFB(τn)
by choosing qFB(τn), and so for large n, pn cannot implement qn, a contradiction.
Consequently, any implementing price schedule must violate the sequentiality con-
dition for sufﬁciently large n.
This failure of the sequentiality condition is not an artefact of our particular
construction of a tail pool: It can be shown that all tail-pooling competitive se-
quences converge to a closed market when b ≤ 2, implying that tail-pooling com-
petitive sequences must converge to a closed market under precisely the same con-
ditions as separating competitive trading schedules. This is despite the fact that
for every τ there exist competitive tail-pooling trading schedules interim Pareto-
dominating the competitive separating trading schedule.17 Every tail-pooling com-
petitive sequence converges to a closed market when b ≤ 2 because sustaining a
tail-pool for large τn requires a large pooling quantity ˆ xn (to ensure that type τn
is willing to participate in the pool), which in turn requires the cutoff-type, ˆ θn, to
also be large. That is, limn ˆ xn = ∞ and limn ˆ θn = ∞. But for b ≤ 2 this implies
convergence to a closed market for the same reason that separating competitive
sequences converge to a closed market. The tail-pool zero-proﬁt trading schedule
of lemma 5.3 converges to a liquid market, on the other hand, because both the
pooling quantity and cutoff type are bounded away from inﬁnity as n gets large.
5.3 Semi-pooling Trading Schedules
The difﬁculties noted after the statement of lemma 5.3 are avoided by adjusting the
construction of a tail-pooling trading schedule to allow sufﬁciently extreme types
to separate.
Deﬁnition 5.2 For Θ = [−τ,τ], a symmetric trading schedule q is semi-pooling if
there exists a pooling interval ( ˆ θ, ¯ θ] where 0 < ˆ θ < ¯ θ < τ and a pooling quantity
ˆ x > 0 such that
q(θ) = ˆ x, ∀θ ∈ ( ˆ θ, ¯ θ]
and the restriction of q to θ ∈ [−τ,− ¯ θ)∪[− ˆ θ, ˆ θ]∪( ¯ θ,τ] is one-to-one.
A semi-pooling trading schedule differs from a tail-pooling trading schedule
only in that the types θ ∈( ¯ θ,τ] do not choose the pooling quantity ˆ x but are instead
separated.
In conjunction with lemma 5.2 the following result establishes theorem 4.2.
17That is, every non-zero type of the investor achieves a higher payoff under the former than under
the later. As market makers obtain zero proﬁts under any competitive trading schedule, this is the
appropriate notion of interim Pareto-dominance.
20Lemma 5.4 Suppose b ∈ (1,2] and there exists ˆ θ > 0 satisfying (b−1) ˆ θ > e∗( ˆ θ).
For every sequence {τn} with τn → ∞, there exists an associated competitive se-
quence {(τn,qn,pn)} converging to a liquid market, with limnqn(θ)=qt(θ) for all
θ, where qt is the limit tail-pooling schedule from section 5.2.
Wenowdescribetheconstructionofthecompetitivesemi-poolingtradingsched-
ule qn for sufﬁciently large n. Lemma D.1 in appendix D ensures that for large n,
there exists a triple ( ¯ θn, ˆ xn, ˆ pn) ∈ R3 satisfying the properties required in this con-
struction. (Note that ˆ pn is a number, while pn is a pricing schedule.) The formal
argument showing the convergence of such a sequence to a liquid market is pro-
vided in lemma D.2.
Ourconstructionofthecompetitivesemi-poolingscheduleqn isillustratedinin
ﬁgure 3 for positive types. The solid line depicts the trading schedule. The pooling
interval is given by ( ˆ θ, ¯ θn] with ¯ θn < τn and ˆ θ satisfying the condition (b−1) ˆ θ >
e∗( ˆ θ). The pooling quantity is ˆ xn. For θ > ¯ θn the trading schedule is identical to
the unique separating competitive trading schedule on [−τn,τn] illustrated in ﬁgure
1. Type ¯ θn is indifferent between his trade in the separating competitive trading
schedule, qs
n( ¯ θn), and trading the pooling quantity at the price
ˆ pn = En

θ|θ ∈ ( ˆ θ, ¯ θn]

< b ˆ θ, (21)
where the inequality will hold for n sufﬁciently large. The pooling quantity ˆ xn
satisﬁes the condition that it be the optimal quantity for type ˆ θ taking as given the
price ˆ pn:
ˆ xn = argmax
x




(b ˆ θ − ˆ pn)
r
> 0,
where the inequality is from the inequality in (21). Finally, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ ˆ θ, the
trading schedule is given by the zero-proﬁt separating trading schedule on [− ˆ θ, ˆ θ]
satisfyingtheinitialconditionq( ˆ θ)=xn wherexn ∈(0, ˆ xn)satisﬁestheindifference
condition
u(xn, ˆ θ)− ˆ θxn =
(b ˆ θ − ˆ pn)2
r
,
with the inequality in (21) ensuring that the quantity xn is well-deﬁned and strictly
positive.
It is immediate from the construction of the semi-pooling trading schedule
qn that the trading schedule is implemented by a price schedule pn specifying
pn(ˆ xn) = ˆ pn and pn(qn(θ)) = θ for all θ that are separated,18 and sufﬁciently
18Note that we have ensured that type ˆ θ (resp., ¯ θn) is indifferent between trading the pooling
quantity ˆ x at price ˆ p to trading the quantity xn at price ˆ θ (resp., to trading the quantity qs
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Figure 3: Semi-pooling competitive trading schedule with pooling quantity ˆ xn and
pooling interval ( ˆ θ, ¯ θn]. The solid line depicts the trading schedule qn.
22unattractive prices for all quantities q outside the range of the trading schedule.
Hence, qn is a zero-proﬁt trading schedule.
To verify that qn is in fact competitive, and not just zero-proﬁt, requires ex-
tending the zero-proﬁt speciﬁcation of the price schedule pn to quantities not in
the range of qn. This extension is illustrated in ﬁgure 3 where the heavy dashed
lines indicate the speciﬁcation of the price schedule pn outside the range of qn.
For quantities x in the interval (xn, ˆ xn), the price pn(x) is set to make ˆ θ indifferent
between trading x at the price pn(x) and trading ˆ xn at the price ˆ pn (equivalently,
trading xn at the price ˆ θ); for quantities x ∈ (ˆ xn,qs
n( ¯ θn)), the price pn(x) is set to
make ¯ θn indifferent between trading x at the price pn(x) and trading ˆ xn at the price
ˆ pn (equivalently, trading qs
n( ¯ θn) at the price ¯ θn); and ﬁnally, for x > qFB(τn), set
pn(x) = τn. In addition to implementing qn (this is immediate from the single-
crossing property of u and footnote 18) the deﬁned price function is increasing and
continuous (and so satisﬁes the sequentiality condition).
In the proof of lemma D.2, we demonstrate that due to b ≤ 2, the sequence ¯ θn
associated with the semi-pooling schedule qn converges to inﬁnity, implying that
the sequence of pooling quantities {ˆ xn} converges to the strictly positive limit ˆ x
given in (19), and that the sequence of pooling prices { ˆ pn} converges to ˆ θ +e∗( ˆ θ).
The sequence of semi-pooling trading schedules thus converges pointwise to the
same limit as the sequence of tail-pooling schedules constructed in section 5.2. In
particular, the sequence converges to a liquid market, thus proving lemma 5.4.
Remark 5.2 We return to the issue raised in remark 4.1, namely the need to study
extremeadverseselectionasthelimitofnon-extremeadverseselection. Aswesaw
in that remark, simply adopting the notion of viability to the unbounded case leads
to a failure of continuity (more speciﬁcally, upper hemicontinuity). Remark 5.1
discussed a failure of lower hemicontinuity for the similar adoption of competitive
schedules.
An alternative limit model abandons the requirement that a price schedule must
attach a ﬁnite price to every quantity (so that market makers can refuse to execute
some trades). This amounts to restricting the domain of p and the set of feasible
trades in the deﬁnitions of competitive and viable schedules. Under these deﬁ-
nitions, the limit tail-pooling schedule from section 5.2 is “competitive.” While
our analysis in this subsection does show that this schedule is the limit of com-
petitive schedules for the bounded support models, it also shows that this result is
non-trivial (due to the sequentiality condition). Moreover, we do not know if arbi-
trary “competitive” trading schedules can be approximated by competitive trading
schedules for large, but bounded support.

236 Convergence to Closed Markets
In this section, we prove theorem 4.1, i.e, that every viable sequence converges to
a closed market if the market breakdown condition (17) holds. We present the key
steps, relegating the more technical arguments to appendix E.
Suppose {(τn,qn,pn)} is a viable sequence. For type distribution Fn, denote





with viability implying Πn ≥ 0 for all n.
Since the market environment includes the possibility of both negative and
positive types, as well as as market makers acting as both buyers and sellers, proﬁts
from trades on one side of the market can subsidize losses on the other. However,
because the environment is symmetric, there is no loss of generality in assuming







Then, by lemma E.2, if {(τn,qn,pn)} is a viable sequence that does not converge to
a closed market, we can assume without loss of generality that qn(0) = 0 for all n,
the existence of ˆ θ >0 such that qn( ˆ θ)→ ˆ x>0, and Π+
n →Π+ ≥0. We will obtain
a contradiction by showing that under (17), no viable sequence satisﬁes these three
properties. To show this, we clearly can restrict attention to θ ≥ 0.





[1−F∗( ˆ θ)]ˆ x2+2
Z ∞
θ† sFB(θ)f∗(θ)dθ < 0. (23)
FromlemmaE.1, qn(θ†)isboundedandtherethusexistsasubsequence{(τm,qm,pm)}
of {(τn,qn,pn)} such that qm(θ†) → x†. As every implementable trading schedule
is increasing, we have x† ≥ ˆ x.
We now argue that if the market breakdown condition (17) holds, {Π+
n } is
bounded above by a sequence converging to the left hand side of (23), contradicting
the hypothesis Π+
n → Π+ ≥ 0 and thus establishing theorem 4.1.











24is the virtual surplus.
As{qn(θ)}maybeunboundedasafunctionofθ, wedeﬁne ˜ qn(θ)≡min{qn(θ),qn(θ†)}
and write the expression for Π+

















[(b−1)θ fn(θ)−b(1−Fn(θ))] ˜ qn(θ)dθ,



















(1−Fn( ˆ θ))(qn( ˆ θ))2
(where the inequality is an implication of θ† > ˆ θ and qn increasing).
A calculation (see lemma E.3) shows that the second integral in (25) is, for




















(1−Fn( ˆ θ))(qn( ˆ θ))2 = −
r
2
(1−F∗( ˆ θ))ˆ x2,
from (23), the term in braces in (26) is strictly negative for sufﬁciently large n.
It remains only to argue that Gn cannot dominate the other terms. It is here that
the market-breakdown condition is used. By the next lemma, that integral does
converge to zero, and so Π+
n is eventually negative, contradicting the viability of
qn.
25Lemma 6.1 Suppose τn → ∞ and {x†
n} is a sequence of numbers converging to







qn : [0,τn] → [0,x†
n] increasing. (28)
If (b−1)θ ≤ e∗(θ) for all θ ≥ 0, then Hn → 0.
Proof. The constrained maximization problem described by (27) subject to
(28) is a special case of the optimal auction design problem in Myerson (1981).





{(b−1)θ fn(θ)−b(1−Fn(θ))} dθ. (29)
Suppose the sequence {Hn} does not converge to zero. As Hn ≥ 0 for all n,
the ﬁrst moment of F∗ is ﬁnite, and x†
n → x†, the sequence {Hn} is bounded. We
may thus assume (by taking an appropriate subsequence if necessary) Hn →H >0.
Suppose, ﬁrst, the associated sequence {θn} satisfying (29) is unbounded. Then,











(b−1)θ dF∗(θ) → 0,
contradicting the hypothesis Hn → H > 0.
Suppose, then, that the sequence {θn} satisfying (29) is bounded. Then there
exists a subsequence {θm} such that θm → ¯ θ ≥ 0. Performing an integration by




Hm → x†(1−F∗( ¯ θ))[(b−1) ¯ θ −e∗( ¯ θ)].
By assumption (b−1) ¯ θ −e∗( ¯ θ) ≤ 0 holds for all ¯ θ ≥ 0, contradicting the hypoth-
esis Hn → H > 0, ﬁnishing the proof.
26Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let ˆ θ denote the random variable bθ. Because the distribution of ˆ θ is symmetric
with density decreasing in |θ|, it follows from Eaton (1981, proposition 1) that we
may assume the existence of a random variable µ so that the distribution of ( ˆ θ,µ)
is rotation invariant and independent of ε. Let α ∈ (0,2π) satisfy tanα =
√
b−1
and deﬁne random variables x and y as the solution to the equations
µ = xcosα +ysinα
and ˆ θ = −xsinα +ycosα.
Because (x,y) is a rotation of ( ˆ θ,µ), the distribution of (x,y) is identical to the
distribution of ( ˆ θ,µ) and thus, in particular, rotation invariant. Let t = ycosα and
ω = xsinα/r. As a linear transformation of (x,y), the random variables (t,ω) are
elliptically distributed (Fang, Kotz, and Ng, 1990). Because elliptically distrib-
uted random variables possess the linear conditional expectation property (Hardin,








As E[ν|t −rω] = E[t|t −rω] and (t −rω) = ˆ θ = bθ holds by construction, this















where the second equality uses the fact that the distribution of (x,y) is rotation
invariant and the corresponding standard deviations thus satisfy σx = σy.
B Properties of the Mean Excess Function
For a distribution function F with support [−τ,τ], let e : [0,τ) → R be the mean
excess function deﬁned by





˜ θ dF( ˜ θ)−θ.
27The mean excess function for F∗ is e∗ : [0,∞) → R deﬁned by e∗(θ) = E∗[ ˜ θ −
θ| ˜ θ > θ].



















Proof. This follows from integration by parts (for e∗, use the property that
limθ→∞θ(1−F∗(θ)) = 0, an implication of the existence of the ﬁrst moment of
F∗).
Lemma B.2 Suppose τn →∞. Then, the associated sequence of mean excess func-
tions {en} converges to e∗ pointwise.






C The Market Breakdown Condition
Proof of theorem 4.3. By construction, the mean excess function of the random






Hence e∗(θ) ≥ θ/(β −1). Since β ≤ b/(b−1), this implies e∗(θ) ≥ (b−1)θ.
Proof of theorem 4.4. Let limθ→∞g∗(θ)=g, where g is possibly inﬁnite. The
ﬁniteness of the kth-moment of F∗ for k ≥ 2 implies g > k ≥ 2 (Lariviere, 2006,
theorem 2).19 Using lemma B.1 for the ﬁrst equality and applying l’Hˆ opital’s rule











(1−F∗( ˜ θ))d ˜ θ)
19Lariviere (2006, theorem 2) assumes g∗ is increasing, but the proof only uses g∗ increasing to


























where the second inequality uses the assumption b ≥ k/(k−1).
D Competitive Trading Schedules
Proof of lemma 5.1. Since a symmetric separating zero-proﬁt trading schedule
q : [−τ,τ] → R satisﬁes q(−θ) = −q(θ), it is enough to show the existence of a




and qs(τ) = ¯ x. (32)
The differentiability of any one-to-one function qs satisfying (31), the key property
in the subsequent analysis, would follow from Mailath (1987, Theorem 2), ex-
cept that belief monotonicity (his condition (2)) is not satisﬁed. Belief monotonic-
ity requires that the marginal payoff to a change in the beliefs of the uninformed
agents (here given by −x) never equals 0. However, since single crossing implies
a strictly increasing solution to (31), at most θ = 0 can choose x = 0, and so belief
monotonicity holds for interior types. An examination of the arguments in Mailath
(1987) reveals this is enough to obtain differentiability.
We verify existence and uniqueness directly. The maximization problem in







Letting y(x) = (qs)−1(x) and rearranging, we have
xy 0−(b−1)y = −rx. (34)
29Suppose b 6= 2. The linear function rx/(b−2) is a particular solution to (34),
and βxb−1 is a general solution to the homogeneous differential equation xy 0 −





(this is well-deﬁned since x ≥ 0), where β is chosen to satisfy the initial value
implied by (32),
y(¯ x) = τ. (36)
Thus,








Suppose now b = 2. Rewrite (34) as xy 0 = y−rx, and differentiate, yielding
y 0+xy 00 = y 0−r. That is, y 00 = −r/x. Integrating twice gives y(x) = −r
R
logx+
αx+κ, where α and κ are constants. Equation (34) is only satisﬁed if κ = 0.
Hence, the general solution is
y(x) = −rxlogx+rx+αx (38)
for x > 0 with y(0) = 0. The parameter α is chosen so that (36) holds.
It remains to verify the uniqueness claim (monotonicity can be veriﬁed by cal-
culation). For all ε ∈ (0, ¯ x), the equation (b−1)y/x−r is Lipschitz in x for all
x ∈ [ε, ¯ x], the initial value problem (34) and (36) has a unique solution on [ε, ¯ x].
Letting ε → 0 gives uniqueness on [0, ¯ x], and so the initial value problem (33) and
(32) has the inverse of y as a unique solution.
Proof of lemma 5.2. Fix n. From lemma 5.1, there is a unique symmetric
separating competitive trading schedule qs
n. For b 6= 2, the schedule is implicitly






















For b < 2, as τn → ∞, we have βn → ∞. In other words, for a ﬁxed trade
level x > 0, the type choosing that trade diverges. Equivalently, (since the trading
30schedules are ordered, with qs
n(θ) > qs
n0(θ) for 0 ≤ θ ≤ τn if τn < τ0
n) the trade
of any ﬁxed type converges to 0. Similarly, for b = 2, as τn → ∞, for a ﬁxed trade
level x>0, the type choosing that trade diverges. Hence, if b≤2 every competitive
sequence of separating trading schedules converges to a closed market.
Finally, for b > 2, βn → 0 as τn → ∞, and so qn(θ) → (b−2)θ/r for all θ in
every competitive sequence of separating trading schedules.
Lemma D.1 Let ˆ θ > 0 satisfy (b−1) ˆ θ > e∗( ˆ θ). For any {τn} satisfying τn → ∞
there exists an associated sequence {( ¯ θn, ˆ xn, ˆ pn)} with ( ¯ θn, ˆ xn, ˆ pn) ∈ R3, satisfying
for all n sufﬁciently large, ¯ θn ∈ ( ˆ θ,τn),
ˆ pn =En

θ | θ ∈ ( ˆ θ, ¯ θn]

< b ˆ θ, (39)
ˆ xn =





n( ¯ θn) =u(ˆ xn, ¯ θn)− ˆ pnˆ xn, (41)
whereUs
n : [−τn,τn] → R is the payoff function associated with the unique separat-
ing competitive trading schedule on [−τn,τn].
Proof of lemma D.1. Observe ﬁrst that there exists N such that ˆ θ < τn for all
n ≥ N.
Consider any sequence { ¯ θn} satisfying ¯ θn ∈ ( ˆ θ,τn) for all n ≥ N. For such n,
determine ( ˆ pn, ˆ xn) by the equalities in (39) and (40). From lemma B.2, we have
en( ˆ θ) → e∗( ˆ θ) and thus,
(b−1) ˆ θ > en( ˆ θ). (42)
for n large. Because
En

θ | θ ∈ ( ˆ θ, ¯ θn]

< ˆ θ +en( ˆ θ)
it is immediate from (42) that the inequality in (39) and, thus the inequality in (40),
holds for all sufﬁciently large n.
It remains to argue that the sequence { ¯ θn} can be chosen such that (41) holds
for n large. Towards this end, note ﬁrst that since ˆ xn is the utility maximizing
quantity for trader ˆ θ facing a ﬁxed price of ˆ pn ≥ ˆ θ, and the trader captures the ﬁrst
best surplus at the price ˆ θ when trading the quantity qFB( ˆ θ), we have u(ˆ xn, ˆ θ)−
ˆ pnˆ xn ≤ sFB( ˆ θ). Moreover, for n ﬁxed, ˆ pn and ˆ xn are continuous functions of ¯ θn ∈
[ ˆ θ,τn].
31At the point ¯ θn = ˆ θ we have ˆ pn = ˆ θ and thus ˆ xn = qFB( ˆ θ), implying that the
right side of (41) is strictly larger than the left side (as Us
n(θ) < sFB(θ) for all
θ ∈ (0,τn)). As
u(ˆ xn, ¯ θn)− ˆ pnˆ xn = ( ¯ θn− ˆ θ)ˆ xn+u(ˆ xn, ˆ θ)− ˆ pnˆ xn ≤ ( ¯ θn− ˆ θ)qFB( ˆ θ)+sFB( ˆ θ),
the right side of (41) increases linearly with ¯ θn. Consequently, because Us
n(τn) =
sFB(τn) is a quadratic function of τn, for n large the left side of (41) is strictly larger
than the right side at ¯ θn = τn. As both sides of (41) are continuous in ¯ θn it then
follows from the intermediate value theorem that there exists ¯ θn ∈ ( ˆ θ,τn) such that
(41) holds.
Lemma D.2 The semi-pooling trading schedule constructed in section 5.3 con-
verges to a liquid market.
Proof of lemma D.2. Under qn, the quantity traded by ˆ θ is
ˆ xn >
[(b−1) ˆ θ −en( ˆ θ)]
r
.
Let η ≡ [(b−1) ˆ θ −e∗( ˆ θ)]/2 > 0. Since for large n,
 en( ˆ θ)−e∗( ˆ θ)
  < η, the
quantity traded by ˆ θ is bounded below by






It remains to argue that, for θ 6= 0, qn(θ) converges to a nonzero quantity.
We claim that ¯ θn → ∞ as n → ∞: If not, there exists a subsequence with ¯ θn →
¯ θ < ∞. But, as b ≤ 2, we then have qs
n( ¯ θn) → 0, and so Us
n( ¯ θn) → 0. However,
Us
n( ¯ θn) = [2b ¯ θn −b ˆ θ − ˆ pn)]ˆ xn/2, the utility from pooling. Since this latter term
is no smaller than (b−1) ¯ θnˆ xn/2, which is bounded away from zero, we have a
contradiction.
Consequently, qn converges pointwise to qt.
E Convergence to Closed Markets
For any viable trading and price schedule pair (qn,pn), aggregate trading proﬁts
are
πn(θ) = [pn(qn(θ))−θ)]qn(θ),
32the surplus function is given by
Sn(θ) ≡ s(qn(θ),θ) = Rn(θ)+πn(θ),





fn(θ) qn(θ), if θ < 0,
Sn(θ)−b
1−Fn(θ)
fn(θ) qn(θ), if θ > 0.
When we decorate a trading schedule, such as ˇ qn, the corresponding functions
deﬁned above are similarly decorated.






Lemma E.1 Let {(τn,qn,pn)} be a viable sequence. Then for all θ ∈ R the se-
quence {qn(θ)} is bounded.
Proof. Suppose there exists ˆ θ ∈ R such that {qn( ˆ θ)} is unbounded above
(the case in which {qn( ˆ θ)} is unbounded below is analogous). There then exists
a subsequence {qm} such that qm( ˆ θ) → ∞. For ﬁxed θ† > ˆ θ, since the trading
schedules qm are increasing (lemma 3.1), we have
qm(θ) → ∞, ∀θ ∈ [ ˆ θ,θ†]. (44)



























where the ﬁrst line follows from Fm being the τm-truncation of F∗ and the second
from (43).







where σ2 is the variance of F∗. From (8) and (44) we have Sm(θ) → −∞ for all




Hence, the right side of (45) converges to −∞, and so Πm → −∞, contradicting the
hypothesis that {qn} is a viable sequence.
Lemma E.2 If there exists a viable sequence not converging to a closed market,
then there exists a viable sequence {(τm, ˇ qm, ˇ pm)} satisfying:
1. there exist ˆ θ > 0 and ˆ x > 0 such that ˇ qm( ˆ θ) → ˆ x as m → ∞,
2. ˇ qm(0) = 0 for all m, and





ˇ πn(θ)dFn(θ) → ˇ Π+ as m → ∞.
Proof. The lemma is established in three steps, in which we sequentially con-
struct the sequence, verifying at each step that the desired property holds. Denote
by {(τn,qn,pn)} the viable sequence not converging to a closed market.
STEP 1 As the sequence {(τn,qn,pn)} does not converge to a closed market, there
is a type θ∗ such that qn(θ∗) does not converge to zero. From lemma E.1, the
sequence {qn(θ∗)} is bounded, so there exists a subsequence {(τm,qm,pm)} of
{(τn,qn,pn)} such that qm(θ∗) → x∗ 6= 0. If x∗ > 0 and θ∗ > 0, then property 1 in
the statement of the Lemma holds for the viable sequence {(τm,qm,pm)}.
Ifx∗ >0andθ∗ ≤0, considerany ˆ θ >0≥θ∗. Asqm isincreasinginθ forallm
and{qm( ˆ θ)}isbounded, thereexistsasubsequence{(τk,qk,pk)}of{(τm,qm,pm)}
and an ˆ x≥x∗ >0 such that qk( ˆ θ)→ ˆ x, verifying property 1 for the viable sequence
{(τk,qk,pk)}.
If x∗ < 0, deﬁne a new sequence {(τm,q†
m,p†
m)} by “ﬂipping” {qm} and {pm},
i.e., q†
m(θ) = −qm(−θ) for all θ and m, p†
m(x) = −pm(−x) for all x and m. This
sequence then satisﬁes q†
m(−θ∗) → −x∗ > 0 and is viable for {Fm}, because Fm is
symmetric. Replacing θ∗ by −θ∗, x∗ by −x∗, and {qm} by {q†
m} in the arguments
for the case x∗ > 0 establishes property 1.
34STEP 2 By step 1, we can now assume property 1 holds for the original sequence,






min[qn(θ),0], if θ < 0
0, if θ = 0
max[qn(θ),0], if θ > 0
Thetradingsequence{ˇ qn}satisﬁes ˇ qn(0)=0forallnand ˇ qn( ˆ θ)→ ˆ x>0. Weshow
next that ˇ qn is viable for Fn for each n, establishing the existence of a sequence
{τn, ˇ qn, ˇ pn)} satisfying properties 1 and 2 in the statement of the lemma. Towards
this end note, ﬁrst, that as qn is increasing so is ˇ qn. Lemma 3.1 implies that, for all
n, the trading schedule ˇ qn is implementable. To show that {ˇ qn} is viable, it sufﬁces
to show that
ˇ Rn(θ) ≤ Rn(θ) and s(ˇ qn(θ),θ) ≥ s(qn(θ),θ) (46)
and thus ˇ πn(θ) ≥ πn(θ) holds for all θ.
Let θn = inf{θ | ˇ qn(θ) = 0} (we do not exclude the possibility θn = −τn)
and ¯ θn = sup{θ | ˇ qn(θ) = 0} (we do not exclude the possibility ¯ θn = τn). For all
θ ∈ (θn, ¯ θn) (46) holds because for those types ˇ Rn(θ) = 0 ≤ Rn(θ) and s(ˇ qn(θ) =
0 ≥ s(qn(θ),θ), where the latter inequality follows from (8) and observing that
qn(θ)θ ≤ 0 for all types in (θn, ¯ θn). Consider then θ > ¯ θn. By construction, we
have ˇ qn(θ) = qn(θ) and thus s(ˇ qn(θ),θ) = s(qn(θ),θ). From (14) we have
ˇ Rn(θ†)− ˇ Rn( ¯ θn) = Rn(θ†)−Rn( ¯ θn), ∀θ† > ¯ θn,
implying (46) (because ˇ Rn( ¯ θn) = 0 ≤ Rn( ¯ θn)). For θ < θn, (46) follows from an
analogous argument, establishing the viability of {ˇ qn}.
STEP 3 Let {(τn,qn,pn)} be a viable sequence satisfying properties 1 and 2 in the










By hypothesis, qn(0) = 0 and thus Rn(0) = 0 holds for all n, and so from lemma












35We next show that the sequences {Π−
n } and {Π+
n } are bounded so that there
exists a subsequence {(τm,qm,pm)}, Π− ∈R, and Π+ ∈R such that Π−
m →Π− and
Π+































n } is bounded above. An analogous argument shows that
{Π−
n }isboundedabove. Because{(τn,qn,pn)}isviablewehaveΠn =Π−
n +Π+
n ≥
0 for all n. It then follows from the fact that {Π−
n } (resp. {Π+
n }) is bounded above
that {Π+
n } (resp. {Π−
n }) is bounded below.
Let {(τm,qm,pm)} be a subsequence of {(τn,qn,pn)} satisfying Π−
m → Π− and
Π+
m → Π+. If Π+ ≥ 0, the sequence {(τm,qm,pm)} satisﬁes properties 1–3 in the
statement of the lemma and so is the desired sequence {(τm, ˇ qm, ˇ pm)}.





m(θ) = −qm(−θ) for all θ and m, and p†
m(x) = −pm(−x) for all x and
m. By construction, this sequence satisﬁes properties 2 and 3 in the statement of
the lemma and, because of symmetry, is viable. We complete our argument by
demonstrating that there is a subsequence {(τk, ˇ qk, ˇ pk)} of the ﬂipped sequence
{(τm,q†
m,p†
m)} also satisfying property 1. Suppose not. Then we must have, for the
unﬂipped sequence, qm(θ) → 0 for all θ < 0. [If not, we can ﬁnd a type ˇ θ < 0 and
a subsequence {qk} such that qk( ˇ θ) → ˇ x 6= 0. Because qk( ˇ θ) ≤ 0 holds for all k we
must have ˇ x<0, and so the ﬂipped sequence satisﬁes property 1.] Let 0<ε <Π−.














36and that the second integral on the right hand side converges to zero because
qm(θ) → 0 for all θ ∈ [ ˆ θ,0], we obtain a contradiction to the hypothesis Π−
m →
Π− > ε.









Proof. The integrand on the left is equal to zero for all θ ∈ (0,θ†]. For θ ≥ θ† we
have qn(θ) ≥ qn(θ†) = ˜ qn(θ) ≥ 0 and thus




≤ Sn(θ)− ˜ Sn(θ)
≤ sFB(θ)
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